The centerpiece of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) was the Senior Executive Service (SES). The SES is a personnel system for top career and political executives, encompassing position management, staffing, performance incentives, and employee development, in which rank is assigned to persons rather than positions. When President Carter proposed the SES, he probably had no idea his tenure in the White House would be so short lived. Conversely, although SES was originally granted only a 5-year life span, it has survived more than 10 years beyond the end of the Carter term, including two presidential transitions under Reagan and Bush.
How well is the SES working? Despite an early flurry of research about SES, relatively little systematic research has addressed this question. This article begins to fill this gap. It tests a model of the policy logic of SES's personnel management provisions to influence outcomes, particularly individual competence, motivation, and performance.
Policy Provisions and Logic
The SES is a complex, multifaceted program. The focus of this analysis is primarily upon the personnel management features of SES. The effects of SES on the ability of political executives to direct bureaus, agencies, and departments are explored, but only indirectly, to the extent the leverage of political executives is related to these personnel management features. Although scholars (Buchanan, 1981; Ring and Perry, 1983) have categorized the personnel management features of SES somewhat differently, Title N of the CSRA changed four main areas of executive personnel management: position management, staffing, performance incentives, and executive development.
Pre-SESPolicies
Before CSRA, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) established quotas for GS-16 through 18 positions as a means for controlling the number of high-grade positions. Delays in CSC authorization of positions led some agencies to acquire special hiring authorities from Congress. These special hiring authorities, in turn, created inequities in employment and compensation standards and loss of control over the size of the executive cadre. 
--
Source: Buchanan, 1981. Even when agencies were able to receive speedy CSC authorization for a slot, they had to await CSC determination that the responsibilities of the position fit the grade. Once the grade was established, candidates still needed to be evaluated by CSC to determine whether they were qualified for the position. An unintended effect of these lengthy procedures was that it discouraged recruitment of outside candidates, whose appointment might substantiallydelay filling a position.
One of the most prominent features of the system that preceded the SES was that executives were relatively insulated from both adverse personnel actions if they performed poorly and extrinsic rewards if they performed extremely well. Structural protections against prohibited personnel practices effectively shielded poor performers from adverse actions. Performance appraisals were superficial, often focusing on the traits of the individual being evaluated rather than job related behaviors or results. Salary increases tended to be more sensitive to longevity than to performance.
Prior to CSRA, the quality of employee development varied widely across agencies. Where systematic efforts existed, they often focused on short-term rather than long-term needs. Furthermore, executive development was weakly related to promotion, in part because executive development programs were used as dumping grounds for unproductive employees.
Provisions of the SES
To overcome the perceived deficiencies of the systems governing executive personnel, Congress approved a series of sweeping changes. Title IV created a unified executive personnel management system to replace the fragmented set of authorities that preceded SES. The new system attached grade and rank for both career and noncareer executives to persons rather than positions. Noncareer appointments were limited to 10 percent of the total number of positions within the SES; the remaining appointments were career. Because of the political sensitivity of their content, some positions The SeniorExecutive Senice: Is It Improving Managrial Performance?
were reserved for career appointees only. With the exception of these career reserved positions, organizations could assign either career or noncareer appointees to any position.
Title TV also gave agencies considerable flexibility and discretion for staffing SES positions assigned to them. The new system called for agencies to submit their requests for SES positions to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) every two years. Based on these requests, OPM would certify an agency for a specific number of positions for the two-year period. Agencies were also authorized to transfer career appointees to any SES position if they gave 15 days notice of the reassignment. Individual incentives were altered by making annual, job-related performance appraisals mandatory. Executives who fail to perform satisfactorily may be removed from the Service. SES members whose performance is judged as superior by Performance Review Boards, composed of peers from SES, receive cash bonuses. Congress also authorized annual leave to be carried over from year to year and career employees to retain their status if they accept a presidential appointment.
The executive development provisions of Title TV required agencies to develop and receive approval for their programs. Selection of SES candidates must be based on technical competency requirements of the agency. Developmental programs are required to focus on an individual's developmental needs. Qualifications Review Boards, composed of agency representatives, were created to certify that each new SES appointment possesses the requisite managerial competencies.
The Objectives of SES
In an effort to identify a model for evaluation of the personnel management provisions of SES, Buchanan (1981) sought to summarize the relationships among the program components of SES discussed above and the intermediate and ultimate objectives of the SES. Buchanan's schematic of the relationships is reproduced in Figure 1 . The schematic depicts both the direct and indirect results that were expected to flow from implementation of SES.1 It categorizes the programmatic components of the SES into three tracks: personnel allocation, performance effectiveness, and personnel development and certification.
Within the personnel allocation track, central control of SES allocation was expected to facilitate more rational deployment of senior executives. The model posits no further linkages between central control and performance. Rank-in-person mobility was expected to improve the careernoncareer interface and, in turn, produce better agency performance.
The performance effectiveness track was anticipated to clarlfy and link objectives and provide rewards and punishments for achievements. These factors were expected to improve competence and motivation. These improvements were ultimately expected to improve agency performance.
The personnel development and certification track was posited to influence performance both directly and indirectly.
Executive development programs were anticipated to improve individual competence and thereby individual and agency performance. The certification of professional qualifications was expected to increase public confidence. Controls against prohibited personnel practices were anticipated to eliminate such practices and reinforce public confidence. More flexible executive recruitment and placement systems were expected to affect individual competence and performance directly and indirectly, by attracting diverse, high quality talent.
Methods

Data
The data for our analysis came from the 1986 Merit Principles Survey conducted by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSBP). As part of its statutory obligation to report to Congress about implementation of the merit principles articulated in the CSRA, MSPB conducts a survey every three years. The 1986 survey involved a sample of 21,620 employees, which was representative of the full-time permanent work force in 22 federal agencies.* Seventy-seven percent or 16,651 employees returned completed questionnaires.
Section V of the survey contained a special series of questions about the SES to which only SES members responded. Most of the data for the analysis were taken from this part of the survey. About 4,300 of the respondents were SES members. Only respondents who answered all of the questions were included in the analysis. This left a total of approximately 1,700 cases for statistical analysis., Examples of the survey items to which the SES members responded are provided in Tables 1and 2. Scale anchors for most of the Likert-type items were "strongly agreen to "strongly disagree" or "completely successfuln to "completely unsuccessful." The limitation of using survey data to test the model is the sole reliance on individual-level perceptual data to measure higher level constructs, such as agency performance and public confidence. This problem is mitigated to some extent for agency performance, which is formally represented in the model as a latent variable with three associated indicators and corresponding measurement errors. Although independent indicators of agency and program performance and public confidence would have been highly desirable, none were available for the analysis. Despite this limitation, the database provided a reasonably good foundation for an initial assessment of how the personnel management provisions of SES were working.
It should also be noted that the data were sufficient for only a posttest of the effects of SES. A research design incorporating a pretest or other types of controls was preferable. However, no baseline data were available for the variables represented in the model and implementation of the act's provisions is not monitored by MSPB as part of its Merit Principles Survey. In addition, drawing conclusions about the adequacy of the implementation of SES or definitively attributing causality to SES were not the primary purpose of In general, I like working here.
Agency Performance
Y5
How successful is your agency in providing for the initial and continuing systematic development of highly competent senior executives?
Y6
How successful is your agency in providing for program continuity and policy advocacy in the management of public programs? Y7
How successful is your agency in ensuring accountability for honest, economical, and efficient government?
IndividualCompetence
Y8
Career executives have good leadership qualities.
Yg
Career executives have good management skills.
IndividualPerformance
Ylo Career executives view their jobs as an opportunity to make positive, long-term improvements to government service. Yll Career executives work hard to carry out administration initiatives and priorities.
Program Performance Y12 The SES performance appraisal process has improved organizational effectiveness.
Public Confidence
Y13 What do you believe is the current image of federal employees? the analysis. The purpose was more limited: to assess the consistency between present empirical relationships and the original expectations (i.e., the Buchanan model) about these relationships.
Statistical Analysis
The first step in the analysis was to relate items in the 1986 Merit Principles Survey to the concepts incorporated into Buchanan's (1981) model. Given the lack of measurement theory for these concepts, a measurement model was developed by subjecting indicators possessing face validity to a principal component analysis. This was done separately for the two sets of indicators representative of endogenous and exogenous latent variables.
The interpretation of Buchanan's model that formed a starting point for this research is shown in Figure 2 . The endogenous variables included in the figure are Individual Motivation, Individual Competence, Individual Performance, Agency Performance, Program Performance, and Public C~~d e n c e .
The indicators from the 1986 survey for these variables, as determined from a principal component analysis, are displayed in Table 1and designated YI through n3.The Figure 2 are Rational Deployment, Interface, Quality of Political Executives (shortened to Political Executives), Performance Rewards, Appraisal Accuracy, and Prohibited Personnel Practices (shortened to Prohibited Practices). Indicators for these variables, designated Xl through Xl5, are shown in Table 2 .4
The path model in Figure 2 was estimated using LISREL VI, configured as a user procedure in SPSS-X. LISREL is a very general modeling framework allowing for the integration of measurement models of latent variable constructs and structural equation models of relations between latent variables. The general USREL model is described by the following three matrix equations (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1984, p. The strategy for evaluating models in LISREL is essentially focused on replicating the variance-covariance matrix, S, of the indicators. The estimate of S, denoted Z, is formed by estimating the parameters of equations (1) Figure 2 , an interpretation of Buchanan's (1981) Generation of an improved model employed an iterative process of fixing and freeing parameters based on the value of t ratios and modification indices. The final structural model derived is presented in Figure 3 . Measurement model estimates for A, parameters are given in Table 3 , and for A, parameters in Table 4 . Structural model estimates for P parameters are presented in Table 5 , and for r parameters in Table 6 . In all cases, both unstandardized and standardized estimates are presented. R 2 values for measurement model equations are presented in Tables 3 and 4 and for structural equations in Table 7 From a statistical point of view, therefore, the revised model presented in Figure 3 and Tables 3-6 is quite satisfactory.
Results
Estimation of the model in
A comparison of the revised model in Figure 3 with the hypothesized model in Figure 2 shows a moderate amount of similarity but important differences as well. Of the 16 hypothesized paths, 10 are significant in the revised model. All of the hypothesized paths involving quality of political executives, performance rewards, appraisal accuracy, and prohibited practices appear in the empirical model. The major difference between the two models is that 13 of 23 paths in the revised model did not appear in the hypothesized model.
The most important paths (based on standardized parameter estimates) in the revised structural model occur between individual competence and individual performance (.680), performance rewards and program performance (.630), and prohibited practices and agency performance (.659). Although the hypothesized model predicted positive relationships among all the variables, the paths between political executives and individual performance (-,187) and prohibited practices and individual competence (-.166) were negative.
A major difference between the hypothesized and revised models involved the career-noncareer interface variable. The hypothesized model predicted that career-noncareer interface would directly. affect agency performance. Instead, there are no significant linkages between interface and agency performance or any of the other ultimate performance variables. There are, however, several significant paths with individual behaviors. Career-noncareer interface directly influences individual competence, motivation, and performance.
The status of the agency performance variable is quite different in the revised than in the hypothesized model. Competence and motivation are indirectly related to agency performance rather than directly as hypothesized. Furthermore, agency performance is not significantly related to either program performance or public confidence as predicted. Performance rewards were directly linked to agency performance, also contrary to the original prediction.
The original model had predicted that most effects on program performance would be indirect, through agency performance. The revised model reveals no significant relationship between agency and program performance. Performance rewards was the only variable in the revised model significantly related to program performance. As noted above, the standardized coefficient for this path indicates it is relatively important in the overall structural model. The revised model also reveals two paths in which the ultimate outcome variables have significant effects on individual motivation. Agency performance, which is indirectly affected by individual motivation through the individual performance variable, has a significant direct influence on individual motivation. Public confidence also has a significant direct effect on individual motivation.
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Discussion
This analysis has assessed the validity of a system of structural relationships assumed by the SES' s framers to be associated with its operation. Although the hypothesized structural model was a poor fit with the data, the analysis indicated relatively good support for some of the individual relationships within the model. The revised structural model was considerably more complex than the hypothesized model and revealed a large number of relationships that were not originally hypothesized.
The revised model provides considerable support for the importance of performance rewards and appraisal accuracy as explanatory variables for both micro-and macro-level outcomes. Although the relationships among these variables were not precisely as hypothesized, the overall set of relationships is supportive of the importance accorded performance rewards and appraisal by the framers of SES. The model suggests that rewards increase both individual competence and performance. These results differ from the general conclusions about CSRA merit pay for middle managers (Pearce, Stevenson, and Perry, 1985; Perry, 1986; Perry, 1988-89; Perry, Petrakis, and Miller, 1989) . The unexpectedly strong direct effect of performance rewards on agency performance suggests that rewards affect not only individual behavior but processes at the agency level as well.
The revised model also provides strong support for traditional concerns about protecting the merit system from political interference. The prohibited personnel practices variable was significantly related to public confidence, as hypothesized, and, in addition, to agency performance. The positive signs for the relationships indicate that as prohibited personnel practices decrease, public confidence and agency performance increase. The results suggest that avoidance of political abuses of the civil service promotes public confidence and an effective working climate within an agency. At the same time, the revised model indicates that an effective balance may still not have been struck between protection of merit and political control. The negative path between prohibited practices and individual competence indicates that, contrary to the intent of the SES, merit protection may unintendedly protect executives who are less competent in performing their jobs.
In several instances, the revised model offers insights about the relationships among some of the variables. The model provides a new perspective about the role of the career-noncareer interface in influencing individual and organizational outcomes. We began with the assumption that the interface affected agency performance, in through the ability of careerists and political appointees to work effectively together to direct policy. This "policy effects" thesis was not supported by the analysis. Instead, the revised model suggests that an "administrative effects" thesis is more accurate in describing the importance of the career-noncareer interface. The revised model suggests that the more significant consequences of the interface are felt at the individual level, where poor relations between careerists and political appointees affects competence, performance, and motivation. This finding coincides with analyses by Heclo (1977) , Light (1987) , and Rainey and Kellough (1990) . It tends to reaffirm a conclusion by Light (1987, p. 171) : "Political appointees appear to do best when they know how to get along with other people."
At the same time, there may be limits to the circumstances under which political appointees and careerists can work together (Heclo, 1977; Sanera, 1984) . The negative path between quality of political executives and individual performance suggests that the direct effect of strong political leadership on individual performance counteracts its indirect effects through the competence and motivation variables. The relationship suggests that strong political leaders who possess experience and good policy and management skills may, in effect, substitute their personal skills for those of subordinate careerists. In conjunction with skilled political executives, the capacities of careerists may be enhanced by better direction and renewed enthusiasm, but their potential contribution is simultaneously diminished because their skills are less consequential. It may also be a function of underlying tenure patterns or numbers of political executives, reflecting that the process of "learning" and "teaching the ropes" detracts from the individual performance of participants in such a process (Ingraham, 1987) .
Another area in which the model sheds new light involves the determinants of individual competence, and motivation. The results suggest some conventional and some unconventional relationships. The relationships among competence, motivation, and performance are entirely conventional (Perry and Porter, 1982) . The relationships between agency performance, public confidence, and individual motivation are relatively unconventional. Individual motivation appears to be responsive not only to individual rewards and direction (i.e., performance awards and appraisal accuracy), but also to contextual factors such as public approval and agency performance. Although these relationships are frequently discussed in the literature, they have seldom been identified empirically (for an exception, see Romzek and Hendricks, 1982) . These relationships also have a particular irony in the context of CSRA. The chief strategy for achieving approval of CSRA and the SES was to "bash the bureaucrat" to convince the electorate and politicians that these new programs were necessary (The National Commission on the Public Service, 1989) . While the strategy succeeded, it no doubt diminished individual motivation and performance by reducing the confidence of people outside the bureaucracy and the perceptions of agency performance by people inside the bureaucracy.
The analysis also suggests that public confidence is ultimately a result of the intersection of politics and adrninistration, not just administrative performance alone. The largest explanatory path for public co&dence in the revised model is from program performance (.172). The chief determinant of program performance is performance rewards, a concept representing primarily administrative decisions associated with the reward and punishment of performance. A case can be made that these direct and indirect influences on public confidence demonstrate the importance of administration on public opinion. At the same time, two other paths not projected in the hypothesized model based on the legislative history are also significant in the revised model. The quality of political executives (.113) and prohibited personnel practices (.098) are significantly, and directly, related to public confidence. These two relationships indicate that factors more directly influenced by politics, i.e., the quality of political appointments and avoidance of political abuses of the civil service, are important determinants of public confidence. The public's confidence ultimately rests, therefore, with both political and administrative factors.
Two other points are worth noting about public confidence. First, for the most part, the explanatory variables that affect public confidence appear to operate quite independently from one another. This suggests that strategies to improve public confidence might profitably pursue political and administrative courses and the positive effects would be cumulative. Second, in the revised model unlike the hypothesized model, public confidence is responsive to concrete improvements in performance, as represented by program performance, rather than more generalized improvements associated with agency performance.
Conclusion
The analysis indicated that the hypothesized structural model based on Buchanan's (1981) assessment of the legislative history, original source documents, and interviews with participants in the legislative process was a relatively poor depiction of the empirical relationships. A revised model was developed that provided a much better fit with survey data from about 1,700 senior executives. The revised model revealed that many of the individual relationships in the hypothesized model were significant, but many significant relationships in the revised model were not originally hypothesized.
As noted earlier, this analysis was able to assess only whether the SES personnel management provisions were working consistent with the original logic of the framers of CSRA. Because aclal implementation was not measured, the relationships in the structural model cannot be causally attributed to SES. Furthermore, limitations in the measurement of some of the latent variables may also have affected the final structural model that was derived, requiring some cau-tion in interpretation. Future research could build upon this study by improving measurement of some of the latent variables and adding terms to the model to measure the actual implementation characteristics of SES program provisions across agencies. James L Perry is professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs (SPEA), Indiana University, Bloomington. His research interests include public management and public personnel. He is the editor of the Handbook of Public Administration (Jossey-Bass, 1989 
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1. Buchanan's model was based on documentary research and 69 interviews with policymakers, personnel and SES members in 1979 and 1980. The 24 policymakers interviewed were involved in the design and legislative approval of SES. A related but somewhat different version of this model is presented in Abramson, Schmidt, and Baxter (1984) . 2. The agencies were: Agriculture, Commerce, Air Force, Army, Navy, Other DOD, Education, Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, General Services Administration, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice, Labor, NASA, Office of 3.
4.
5.
6.
Personnel Management, Small Business Administration, State AID or ICA, Transportation, Treasury, and Veterans Administration. Many of the items in the survey permitted 'no basis to judge" and "don't know" responses. Cases that included such responses were dropped from the analysis. This assured that only respondents who believed they had information about the operation of SES were included in the analysis. Inspection of means and standard deviations for the sample of 1,700 indicated that their responses did not differ appreciably from those for the overall sample. The indicator XI1 was initiallv associated with the Prohibited Practices latent variable. It was subsequently also associated with Political Executives during the LISREL modeling process. The revised model contains nine free measurement error covariance parameters: one associated with equation (2) and eight with equation (3). All structural eauation error covariances are fvred oarameters. The chi-square statistic is inflated when the number of cases is large Qoreskog and Sorbom, 1984, p. 1.39) . To get a sense of how large this influence might be, a model identical to the revised model was estimated using approximately half of the 1,700 cases. The chi-square statistic for that analysis was 574 with 307 degrees of freedom, a ratio of less than 2.
